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ABSTRACT
Testimonial knowledge sometimes depends on internalist epistemic conditions, those that
thinkers are able to reflect upon. In the testimony literature the only internalist conditions
that are considered are those concerning a hearer’s knowledge of a speaker’s reliability. I
argue, however, that the relevant sense of “internal” should not be seen as referring to just
the hearer’s point of view, but rather to the points of view of both the hearer and the
speaker. There are certain cases of testimonial knowledge transmission that depend on the
speaker’s knowledge of his audience.  These include cases of “engineered knowledge” in
which a speaker deviously manipulates a hearer’s beliefs. Such knowledge is therefore
internalist because it depends on factors that are internal to the point of view of the speaker,
and not merely on externalist factors such as the reliability of the speakers’ and hearers’
beliefs.
1. Internalist, Externalist and Hybrid Epistemologies of Testimony
Internalists claim that in order to have knowledge our beliefs must be
justified by mental states that are “cognitively accessible” to the thinker.
Depending on one’s version of internalism, these mental states may
include what is known or justifiably believed by the thinker, what she
can note the presence of by more or less intense reflection, or states of
which she is immediately conscious.1 Externalists deny that knowledge
requires any such consciousness or reflection on the part of the thinker.
Reliabilists are externalist in their approach: they claim that knowledge
simply consists in true beliefs that are acquired via a reliable method,
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that is, via a method that tends to produce true beliefs. Whether and how
a certain method is reliable need not be known or even knowable by the
thinker herself.
With regard to testimony, internalists argue that there must be
reasons accessible to the hearer (H) to think that a speaker’s (S) report is
true. If I am to acquire a justified testimonial belief from Herbert, I must
be able to run through something like the following in my mind: Herbert
is a usually reliable speaker and a knowledgeable plumber; he tells me
that my central heating needs replacing; given his reliability this is likely
to be true; I therefore believe that my central heating needs replacing.
Usually, of course, I just believe what people say without performing
such an inference, but the internalist claim is that I must be able to
articulate some such supporting inference if my testimonial beliefs are to
be justified. It is such beliefs about the reliability of reporters and such
inferences that must be cognitively accessible to thinkers if they are to
have testimonial knowledge.
There are, however, certain problems with the basic internalist,
inferentialist picture. In most cases we have not collected enough
empirical evidence in order to be able to go through the necessary
reasoning. I may know that Herbert is reliable, but I have no evidence
concerning the reliability of Derek the electrician; it would seem, though,
that I am nevertheless justified in believing what he says about the state
of my wiring. 
There are two suggested ways to accommodate for the possibility
of testimonial knowledge even though we do not have the requisite
empirical evidence in support of certain testimonial beliefs. First,
variants of the internalist picture have been developed. Fricker and
Adler, for example, claim that we rightly trust others without being able
to check out the track record of individual speakers; nevertheless, our
trust is grounded in background empirical evidence. Fricker (2002, p.
381) claims that:
On almost any actual occasion of testimony, a normally
knowledgeable adult will be absolutely awash with relevant
circumstantial evidence bearing on the question of whether the
speaker is to be trusted on her topic. She will have, in the
cognitive background in light of which she approaches fresh
instances of testimony, a multitude of background beliefs about
human and non-human nature which are relevant to whether this
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(1991).
fresh instance of testimony, this current invitation to believe on
trust in the teller, is indeed to be trusted or not. 
And Adler (2002, p. 17), that:
We have vast, easily obtained background beliefs that serve as
reasons or evidence to support our acceptance of the word of the
speaker. 
Such background evidence for the reliability of speakers is
multifarious. First, we do have some empirical evidence that many
testimonial reports have been correct in the past. Thus “our maintenance
of the default rule reflects a resilient history of overwhelmingly reliable
testimony” (Adler, 2002, p. 153). And from reports that we have been
able empirically to confirm, we have learnt to spot signs of both sincerity
and deceit in the actions and voices of speakers, and we can look out for
these signs on future occasions.2 We monitor speakers for signs of
insincerity, and for reports that may not sit well with other things we
have heard and other things that we know: “she [H] should be continually
evaluating him [S] for trustworthiness throughout their exchange.”
(Fricker, 1994, p. 150) We also acquire evidence that enables us to form
generalisations concerning the reliability of certain types of person:
philosophy professors know more about formal logic than footballers,
and people over the age of 30 know very little about XBoxLive. Adler
further suggests that our knowledge of the consequences of error with
respect to certain forms of testimony, provides empirical support for the
usual veracity of such talk: astrologers can be wrong without much
comeback, whereas epidemiologists cannot – this provides us with a
reason to think that the reports of epidemiologists are likely to be true.
The beliefs that we acquire via testimony also tend to cohere both with
other testimonial reports and with what we have previously learnt via
perception and can recall via memory, and this provides empirical
support for the reliability of such testimony (and, reciprocally, for the
reliability of those beliefs based on perception and memory). Lastly, the
best explanation for the fact that people’s testimony is generally in
agreement is that their testimony is usually reliable.
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 An alternative response to the claim that we often lack empirical
evidence concerning a speaker’s testimony is to reject internalism and
adopt externalism. H does not require any such evidence concerning the
reliability of S; all that is required is that S is in fact reliable. 
Various writers have also suggested hybrid accounts of testimony.
Lackey argues that testimonial knowledge requires that both internalist
and externalist conditions are satisfied. First, rationality requires that a
thinker is aware of good internalist reasons why her beliefs are true. This
alone, though, is not sufficient for knowledge: one’s beliefs also need to
have a reliable source; the latter, then, being an external epistemic
condition. Lackey (2006b, p. 16) claims that
it takes two to tango: the justificatory work of testimonial beliefs
can be shouldered neither exclusively by the hearer nor by the
speaker.
Thus:
It is, therefore, not enough for testimonial justification that a hearer
have even epistemically excellent reasons for accepting a speaker’s
testimony – the speaker must also do her part in the testimonial
exchange by offering testimony that is reliable or otherwise truth-
conducive. (Lackey, 2006a, p. 10) 
Alston (1988) offers a similar account. He argues that a belief is justified
if it is based on adequate grounds. Such grounds must be psychological
states of the thinker: the ground for the belief that my tea is sweet is my
experience of sweetness. Grounds are therefore construed internally.
Whether or not such grounds are adequate, however, is an external
matter. Adequacy amounts to reliability or truth-conduciveness.3
Hybrid theorists are dissatisfied with the bipolar nature of the
internalism/externalism debate, and I also argue that testimonial
knowledge does not have to slot into a model that is either internalist and
inferentialist, or externalist and reliabilist. I do not claim, though, that H
must satisfy an externalist condition in addition to possessing reasons to
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believe S, and I shall ignore the question of whether S must be reliable in
order for the acquisition of testimonial knowledge to occur. Instead, I
shall focus on internalism, and I shall argue for a distinct version.4
Internalism is so named because the relevant justificatory factors are
internal to the point of view of the knower; they are something upon
which the knower can reflect. In testimonial exchanges, therefore, such
justificatory factors are seen as internal to the point of view of H. I claim,
however, that there are cases of testimonial knowledge in which S plays a
crucial epistemic role, and this role amounts to more than the ability to
be a reliable reporter. S’s epistemic role cannot be construed externally
as a hybrid theorist such as Lackey claims; rather, S needs to have a
certain kind of awareness of the conversation in which he is engaged and
of his audience. I argue that such cases of testimonial knowledge
motivate a form of internalism; one, though, that is relative to S’s and not
H’s point of view. I shall call this “speaker-internalism”.
2. The Epistemic Role of the Speaker in Cases of Engineered
Knowledge
It is lucky in various ways that at the Rolling Stones concert last night I
acquired the knowledge that Keith Richards is right handed; before then I
had always believed that he was left handed. In some sense it is lucky
that I was in a position to acquire such knowledge given that the concert
was sold out and I only managed to get in because there were some
returned tickets. This is what Pritchard (2005) calls capacity epistemic
luck, where “it is lucky that the agent is capable of knowledge” (2005, p.
134). It is also lucky that the concert went ahead at all given Keith’s
recent fall out of the coconut tree; it could very easily have been
cancelled due to his ill health. This is evidential epistemic luck, where “it
is lucky that the agent acquires the evidence that she has in favour of her
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belief” (2005, p. 136). These forms of luck, and others discussed by
Pritchard, are compatible with knowledge.5
There are, however, two forms of luck that are epistemologically
more important; these are reflective and veritic epistemic luck. For now
let us concentrate on the latter. Veritic epistemic luck applies when a
thinker’s beliefs are true by accident. Gettier cases are good examples of
the influence of such luck: my belief that my partner is unexpectedly at
home rather than at work is (seemingly) justified by my hearing her voice
when I return from the shops; what I am hearing, though, is a dictaphone
recording that I earlier left playing; nevertheless, my belief happens to be
true because coincidentally she has taken the day off work through
illness. In the rest of this section I shall suggest scenarios in which it is
S’s knowledge of H that rules out veritic epistemic luck, and thus S’s
knowledge of H that plays a vital epistemic role. We shall return below
to reflective epistemic luck, and to how reflective and veritic luck are
seen as relevant to the debate between internalism and externalism. 
The cases in which I am interested involve S’s devious
manipulation of H’s beliefs, and there is a recipe with which one can
concoct such scenarios: (i) S lies to H; (ii) S intends H to acquire true
information from his lie; and (iii) H comes to know what S intends him
to. These are what I call cases of “engineered knowledge”. 
Perhaps fraudulent results in science can be used to transmit
knowledge. A scientist knows his theory is correct, yet his latest results
are not very clear-cut. Fabricating data would therefore be a better way
of spreading knowledge of his theory. A graph is presented at a lecture to
show how x = y2 (x, say, is the rate of global warming and y the rate of
car production). The audience come to believe that x = y2; and this is a
true belief. The graph, though, has been made up – this particular set of
data has never been collected – but the scientist knows that audiences are
likely to believe theories that are backed up by neat graphical
representations of data. (Newton admitted ‘adjusting’ his data so that it
would be easier to see how it supported his theory of gravity, and Mendel
did the same for his data concerning genetic inheritance.)6 In such a case
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it is plausible that the scientist’s knowledge (of global warming) is
transmitted to his audience, albeit by devious means.
Gillian Michell (1990, p. 189) discusses cases in which women
have to lie, or “tell it slant”, in order to get their point across in a male-
dominated sexist society:
For a woman to achieve the maximally effective exchange of
information in a sexist setting…her only solution is a judicious and
covert violation of the conversational rules that we call telling it
slant. So what a woman gains by telling it slant is the means of
communicating information effectively
And getting it across to an ex-lover that “it’s over” may only be possible
if one says that there’s somebody else; only by lying in this way can H
come to accept and to know the truth.7 
Lastly, Dianne knows that Sam is sexist, and she wants him to
know that her driving instructor is terrible. The instructor is male, but
Sam would never believe that a man could be a bad teacher or a bad
driver. Thus, in describing her lessons Dianne says that “she [the teacher]
doesn’t seem to know what she’s doing”; Dianne knows what Sam is
likely to accept as true. This has the desired effect: Sam comes to believe
that Dianne’s instructor is poor. This belief is true and, given Dianne’s
intention, it is not acquired by accident; it is therefore very plausible that
Sam comes to acquire knowledge concerning the instructor, this
knowledge having been transmitted by Dianne’s testimony. In all these
cases, then, lies are used to pass on knowledge, and they can only do so
because S knows how H is likely to think in these scenarios. It is S’s
knowledge of H’s mind that rules out the mere lucky acquisition of true
belief.
The claim that these cases involve the transmission of knowledge
may not be persuasive if H’s (alleged) knowledge is seen as inferential,
if, that is, Sam infers that “the instructor is poor” from Dianne’s assertion
that “she doesn’t seem to know what she’s doing”, or one infers that “it’s
over” from an ex-lover’s claim that “there’s somebody else”. Here
inferences are made from false beliefs, and some would see this as
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undermining any claims to knowledge.8 First, it should be noted that Sam
does not consciously run through such reasoning in his head; he just
hears that the instructor is poor. Nevertheless, the notion of unconscious
inference is widely accepted and would seem to apply to such cases.
Here, though, this does not undermine claims to knowledge. We must be
clear on the rationale behind the prohibition on false beliefs. It is seen as
lucky if a thinker arrives at a true conclusion from false premises, and so
it is claimed that such reasoning cannot lead to the acquisition of
knowledge. In the cases that I have highlighted, though, it is not lucky
that H comes to have certain true beliefs because these situations are
engineered by S in order that this is so.
The key claim of this paper is that in these scenarios there is an
important internalist factor necessary for the transmission of testimonial
knowledge: this is S’s awareness of how H is likely to think. This is
distinct from the kind of internalist factor cited by inferentialists, that
which involves H’s awareness of S’s reliability. In the driving lesson
scenario, for example, Sam would not acquire knowledge of the driving
instructor if Dianne did not know of his sexist thinking. This knowledge
guides her in what she says to him, and it is Dianne’s insight into Sam’s
mind that allows for knowledge transmission in this case; it is her
awareness of his sexism that rules out the mere lucky acquisition of a
true belief concerning the instructor.
I do not, however, want to claim that these factors provide
“justification” for Sam’s thoughts. In the internalist tradition,
justification is essentially connected with the epistemic praiseworthiness
of the believer. Sam’s beliefs may be true, but they are not praiseworthy
given that they are driven by sexism.9 The acquisition of engineered
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3. Externalist Construals of the Speaker’s Epistemic Role
There are, however, various ways that it could be claimed that my
speaker-internalism is just a form of externalism, and that no new
distinctions have been drawn. It could, for example, be admitted that in
order for Sam to acquire knowledge, Dianne must know how he is likely
to think; Dianne’s knowledge, though, could be construed externally.
Dianne must have knowledge of Sam’s mind, but this need only amount
to the reliable ability to form beliefs about Sam’s thinking (and perhaps
for such beliefs to cause her devious behaviour). Dianne need not,
however, be able to reflect upon her devious strategy and the role that her
beliefs about Sam play in his acquisition of knowledge, or, if she is so
aware, such reflection would have no epistemic role. I reject such a
response: Dianne’s knowledge of Sam’s mind must amount to more than
the possession of such a reliable ability. Consider a scenario in which
Dianne says the very same things in the very same circumstances to Sam,
although she does not reflect upon, or she is not capable of reflecting
upon, how and why her words would lead to him having true beliefs
about the driving instructor. If asked why she falsely referred to the
instructor as “she”, Dianne would not be able to answer. In such a
scenario we would not want to say that Dianne provides Sam with
knowledge. Without any reflection on Dianne’s part it would appear to
be lucky that Sam arrives at his true belief about the instructor.11 This is a
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thinker’s reasons for believing that his cognition is reliable are false. Sam thinks
that his sexist thinking reliably leads to true beliefs, although the fact that this is
false undermines any claims to knowledge that Dianne’s engineering may be seen
to endorse. Thus qualified externalism would not attribute knowledge to Sam in
this kind of case.
case of engineered knowledge and it therefore requires planning and
execution, both of which demand the engineer’s awareness, in this case
the engineer being Dianne.
It was claimed earlier that Sam’s beliefs may not be justified even
though he possesses knowledge. Another externalist strategy, though,
would be to argue that Sam’s beliefs are justified, not by his reasoning
alone, but by the overall process engineered by Dianne. And it is this
justification that can be given an externalist construal, and this that
explains why Sam should be seen as acquiring knowledge. Dianne
initiates a cognitive process in Sam’s mind, one that reliably leads to true
beliefs in the kinds of circumstances in which Dianne triggers this
mechanism. Sam’s reasoning may not be praiseworthy, but the claim here
is that the overall process is; perhaps not morally because of Dianne’s
deception, but it is epistemically praiseworthy given that the process she
initiates leads to true beliefs. There are, though, various problems with
such an account of justification. First, as suggested earlier, whether or
not a belief is justified is usually taken to reflect upon the thinker
himself, that is: “the proper function of the concept of justification, [is]
to provide a certain kind of positive evaluation. The praiseworthiness of
an action or belief is related to the praiseworthiness of the agent or
subject”. (Bird, 2007, p. 27) Saying that a belief is justified is a way of
saying something epistemically positive about the thinker who has that
belief, and there is some tension here in praising Sam’s sexist thinking. 
Second, the essence of reliabilist accounts of justification or
knowledge is that there are causal processes that reliably lead to a thinker
having true beliefs. Our perceptual mechanisms are plausibly examples
of such reliable processes. The kind of process triggered when I stare at
expanses of green reliably leads to me having the belief “that’s green”,
and in any particular case my belief is justified because such a process is
in operation.  Such an account, though, is not applicable to cases like that
involving Dianne and Sam. Dianne does initiate a certain cognitive
mechanism in Sam’s mind, and one that in this case leads to him having a
true belief. It is, though, the kind of mechanism that takes as input,
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representations of women –  either linguistic or perceptual – and gives as
output, certain beliefs about their inferiority. Such a cognitive process is
not reliable unless Dianne or someone equally cunning is there to
engineer the situation. An externalist, therefore, does not seem to be able
to use reliability to ground the claim that in these scenarios H has
knowledge.
The reason why it is difficult to provide a reliabilist account of the
epistemology of these situations is that testimonial knowledge is social; it
involves two thinkers, and thus any account that only refers to the
cognitive mechanisms of one of these thinkers will miss the sometimes
crucial epistemic role of the other protagonist. With this in mind, perhaps
a purer form of externalism could be suggested. The processes involved
do not have to be limited to those that are physically internal to H. There
is a wider process here, one that involves the cognitive mechanisms of
Dianne and Sam, and the interaction of these with certain kinds of
situations in the world. This kind of mechanism could be reliable, and it
could be this that justifies Sam’s thoughts. 
Goldman (1999, p. 130n.) distinguishes two kinds of reliabilist
account, those that are intrapersonal and those that are transpersonal.
Intrapersonal accounts focus on the cognitive mechanisms of H, whereas
transpersonal ones involve those of both H and S. The examples he offers
in support of the latter are cases in which a hearer’s cognition is reliable
yet the speaker’s is not. S, for example, may pass on a belief that she
acquired via an unreliable mechanism. According to a transpersonal
account, the resultant hearer’s belief would be unjustified because the
cognitive processes of both S and H must be reliable in order for H’s
thoughts to have justification. This form of reliabilism accords with an
intuitive account of the transmission of epistemic properties: testimony
cannot generate new epistemic properties – it can only pass on whatever
the speaker’s thoughts already possess, be that justification, warrant or
knowledge.12 This kind of account, though, is of no help with my
scenarios. In them, S’s mechanisms may be reliable, but H’s are not, and
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thus H’s beliefs would come out as unjustified on a transpersonal
account. Such an account cannot therefore provide a reliabilist
explanation of how Sam’s thoughts are justified and how they therefore
amount to knowledge.
For a reliabilist to account successfully for such scenarios, the
focus must be taken off individual thinkers completely. The question of
whether the relevant process is reliable cannot be answered by looking
cumulatively at the thinking of both the hearer and the speaker. What is
needed is an account in which justification is based on the reliability of
the social interaction between S and H. Such interactions are reliable
when they tend to produce true belief on the part of the hearer, and this
interaction can be reliable even if H’s cognitive mechanisms are not
(when, that is, they are considered independently of the manipulation of a
devious S). I shall not pursue such a line here. One should note, though,
that there is a potential defeater of any such developed reliabilist
account, and that consists in S’s inability to reflect upon her devious
strategy. As discussed earlier, if Dianne cannot say why she refers to the
instructor as “she”, then we would not wish to attribute knowledge to
Sam, whether or not the social mechanism involved here is reliable in
generating true beliefs. So far, then, we have not found a satisfying
externalist construal of engineered knowledge.
4. Varieties of Internalism
It is admittedly tempting to claim that the epistemology involved in cases
of engineered knowledge must be externalist in character since the
crucial epistemic factor cited – S’s knowledge of H – is external to H’s
point of view, and that is what defines the externalist position. I have
suggested, though, that engineered knowledge does not sit well within
externalist epistemologies. The distinction between internalism and
externalism rests on the respective epistemic roles of certain subjective
and objective considerations. Externalist knowledge usually depends on
objective facts concerning S’s reliable belief forming mechanisms;
internalist knowledge depends on a thinker’s ability to “construct a
doxastic principle or procedure from the inside, from our own individual
vantage point.” (Goldman, 1980, p. 32) I claim, however, that
“subjective” should be interpreted with respect to the points of view of
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both those involved in a testimonial exchange involving engineered
knowledge, and the relevant sense of “internal” should also be taken in
relation to both protagonists. In normal cases of testimony two
conversants form a partnership engaged in the mutual sharing of beliefs
and knowledge, and knowledge transmission can only occur if S is a
reliable testifier. S’s reliability is thus focused upon by both externalists
and internalists; the former are concerned with S’s actual reliability, and
the latter with H’s evidence for such reliability. In the cases that I have
looked at, though, S plays a distinct epistemic role, and without the
knowledge she has of H’s thinking and her devious intentions,
knowledge would not be transmitted to H. The epistemic role that S plays
depends on her awareness of how the conversation will be interpreted by
H, and S’s role should therefore be seen as providing a necessary
subjective component to this kind of knowledge transmission and thus as
motivating an internalist epistemology or an epistemology that includes
internalist elements.
The claim that S’s epistemic role should be seen as internalist is
supported by David Owens’ (2000) conception of internalism. He rejects
an externalist account of testimony, and of knowledge in general,
because it does not take proper account of the relation between
justification and doxastic responsibility. Externalism amounts to the view
that “unreasonable beliefs are no more down to us than a malfunctioning
digestive system would be” (Owens, 2000, p. 133). The justification for a
thinker’s beliefs must therefore be provided by mental states that can be
reflected upon. He is, though, careful to say that this reflection does not
have to be performed by the thinker herself. Testimony preserves and
passes on evidence and justification acquired by somebody else. My
belief that there is lots of dark matter in the universe is justified, not by
anything of which I am aware, but by evidence upon which physicists
can reflect. This, however, remains an internalist view because
[e]pistemic internalism, properly construed, is just the view that
beliefs need to be justified and that what justifies beliefs are
reasons, states of awareness. A given subject need not be aware of
the reasons that justify his belief, provided he is entitled to presume
there are such reasons. In lumbering themselves with the idea that a
reason must coincide in time and person with the belief it justifies,
internalists do not define their position, they undermine it. (Owens,
2000, pp . 133-134) 
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My claim is distinct from that of Owens, but it is certainly in sympathy
with the spirit of his account. I have suggested that in the cases discussed
there is knowledge without justification; this is something which Owens
does not consider. I am claiming that there are non-justificatory
conditions necessary for testimonial knowledge and that these should be
construed as internalist conditions – as, that is, states of awareness – but
these states need not be those of H.
Another way to accommodate such cases is with a distinct kind of
hybrid position. One does not require an epistemology that involves H
performing an internalist role and S an externalist one. This is the
strategy suggested earlier by hybrid theorists such as Lackey and Alston.
The claim is rather that S herself plays a hybrid role: S’s awareness, by
definition, is external to H’s point of view, but the role that her
awareness plays entails that S’s role should also be seen as internalist in
character. Such an account is hybrid in the sense that S’s epistemic role
cannot be wholly captured by either internalism or externalism, whereas
the usual hybrid accounts involve a purely external role for S. According
to traditional internalist epistemologies, in order to have knowledge the
thinker himself – H – must be aware of reasons why his beliefs are likely
to be true. Such accounts refer, first, to H, and second, to his subjective
awareness. Cases of engineered knowledge force us to consider these
facets of internalism independently. H should not be the sole focus, and
these scenarios involve an epistemic role for the subjective awareness of,
not H, but S. 
Let us now return to Pritchard’s distinction between veritic and
epistemic luck. It is these kinds of luck that can be seen as driving the
debate between internalism and externalism. Reflective epistemic luck is
that which concerns a subject’s point of view: given that I think I do not
know much about history, it is lucky that I answer the questions in the
history exam correctly. Internalists claim that such luck must be ruled out
if one is to have knowledge. Externalists, however, claim that such luck
is compatible with knowledge; they focus instead on the elimination of
veritic epistemic luck, the kind of luck that applies when thinkers have
true beliefs or justified true beliefs by accident, when, for example, as in
Gettier cases, p and a thinker’s belief that p align by chance. Note,
though, that this way of distinguishing internalism and externalism
accords with the claim that my examples involve only external epistemic
factors, a claim that I reject. Dianne’s knowledge of Sam’s sexism is not
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eliminating reflective epistemic luck from the situation; that was never
an issue in this example: from Sam’s point of view it is not lucky that he
comes to have a true belief about the driving instructor. There is evidence
upon which he can reflect: the fact that Dianne, who is usually reliable,
told him so (well, in his eyes she did: she told him that the driving
instructor was a woman, and therefore a bad instructor). Dianne’s
knowledge of Sam should rather be seen as eliminating veritic epistemic
luck since it is not down to chance that Sam’s belief is true – Dianne
engineered the situation so that this would be so. As said, this is
compatible with an externalist description of these cases, an
interpretation that follows from the claim that the engineer’s thoughts
(Dianne’s) are not internal to the hearer’s point of view (Sam’s) and so,
by definition, they must be external epistemic conditions. I have argued,
though, that such scenarios highlight a distinct form of speaker-
internalism, or a kind of internalist factor that contributes to a hybrid
account of S’s epistemic role. Such cases of engineered knowledge
therefore call for further articulation of the role that epistemic luck plays
within epistemology. Reflective epistemic luck is that which the
traditional internalist hopes to eliminate. Veritic epistemic luck,
however, is relevant to both externalist and hybrid theorists such as
Lackey, and also to those scenarios that involve speaker-internalism, or a
hybrid role for S. 
I am not suggesting that speaker-internalism is relevant to all cases
of testimonial knowledge transmission. There are various epistemically
distinct ways of passing on knowledge from one person to another, and
these involve distinct ways of ruling out either veritic or reflective
epistemic luck, but there is no need to have an internalist or an externalist
account that covers them all.13
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